The Ten-Baggers: 126 U.S. stocks that rose elevenfold — and what they had in common beforehand

126 out of 50,545 U.S. stocks examined rose more than elevenfold within five years or less between 2011 and 2026. That is three in a thousand. We ran the calculation across every single U.S. common stock traded in that period — including the 32,371 that no longer exist.

The result runs against expectation. At the starting point, the later winners were not the dynamic growth companies you might assume. They were small, cheaply valued and loss-making three times out of four. In a control group of 444 comparably tradable stocks that never made it, 63 percent were earning money.

And the uncomfortable half of the truth: among the ten-baggers whose price can be tracked past their peak, every second one later gave back more than half of the gain. Fourteen were never traded again after their high.

Who made it — and how rare that is

The starting point was the complete universe of U.S. common stocks: 18,174 currently listed and 32,371 vanished titles. For 44,211 of them a usable price history was available. Within that history we searched for every window of 60 months or less in which the split- and dividend-adjusted price rose at least elevenfold.

Arithmetically there were 11,741 such windows. Most of them are worthless: 10,349 belong to stocks trading at a dollar or less at the starting point — micro caps that jumped from $0.003 to $0.05. Arithmetically an elevenfold rise, practically untradable. That group alone accounts for 88 percent of all apparent ten-baggers and would dominate any unfiltered study.

After removing them and applying every further check, 126 hits remain. At the starting point each had to clear four hurdles: listed on Nasdaq, NYSE or NYSE American, priced above one dollar, worth more than $50 million and turning over more than $100,000 a day.

29 of these 126 companies no longer exist — they were acquired, went bankrupt or dropped off the tape. That is almost a quarter. Anyone running this kind of study on currently tradable stocks alone misses every one of them.

The median advance across the 126 hits is 15.7-fold, the median duration 36 months. 92 of the titles were listed on Nasdaq, 34 on the NYSE.

What the winners had in common at the starting point

This is the core of the study. Judging what set the ten-baggers apart requires a yardstick. So we drew a random sample of stocks that clear the same tradability hurdles but never achieved an elevenfold rise. Fundamentals from SEC annual reports are available for 444 of them and for 111 of the hits.

Three findings stand out.

First, size. At the starting point the later winners were worth a median $214 million — barely a fifth of the control group. Unsurprising, but it narrows the field: anyone hunting for an elevenfold rise is hunting almost exclusively among small caps.

Second, absent profits. Only a quarter of the later ten-baggers were earning money at the starting point. In the control group it was nearly two out of three. That inverts the usual assumption: the largest advances mostly began at companies in the red — biotechs before approval, turnaround cases, businesses the market expected little from.

Third, no growth edge. On revenue growth the two groups are practically identical: 11.2 against 12.5 percent. The ten-baggers were not growing faster beforehand. What set them apart was not a visible growth advantage but an event still to come.

What happened next

Most compilations leave this part out. For all 126 hits we tracked the price after the peak — through to today or to the last trading day.

55 of the 112 titles — almost exactly half — fell more than 50 percent from their high. The median drawdown is 49.5 percent. Another 14 titles do not appear in this calculation at all because they were never traded again after their peak: they were acquired or vanished from the market.

Put differently: catching an elevenfold rise is one thing, keeping it is another. Only 16 of the 126 companies trade higher today than at their peak back then.

What triggered the rise

For each of the 126 cases we researched individually what set the advance in motion. The results fall into seven patterns.

The most common pattern is not a stroke of managerial genius but a demand shift from outside: the build-out of AI data centers repriced suppliers of power, cooling, cabling and semiconductor materials within a few years. 42 of the 126 cases follow this pattern, the vast majority of them from 2022 onward.

How concretely that demand shift lands in the financial statements shows in two sentences from original SEC filings. Sterling Infrastructure, up fortyfold in the study period, writes in its first-quarter 2026 report:

"The recently acquired CEC business contributed $156.1 million to revenue in the quarter."

Source: Sterling Infrastructure, Q1 2026 quarterly report (SEC)

And chip supplier Credo Technology, up 33-fold over the same period, on group revenue in its fiscal 2026 annual report:

"more than tripled to $1.3 billion"

Source: Credo Technology Group, Form 10-K for fiscal year 2026 (SEC), announcement of June 1, 2026

The second most common pattern is the binary approval decision in medicine. 36 cases trace back to a trial result or a market approval — events that can multiply a company's value in a single day. That also explains the high share of loss-making firms: a biotech company before approval has no earnings by definition.

Five cases that show the patterns

Sezzle Inc. — 119.5-fold in 20 months

Der Ratenzahlungs-Anbieter Sezzle (Buy now, pay later) schaffte den Sprung von Verlusten in hohe Gewinne und wuchs gleichzeitig sehr schnell: Umsatz im vierten Quartal 2024 98,2 Mio. USD (Verdopplung gegenueber Vorjahr), im dritten Quartal 2025 116,8 Mio. USD (+67 %) bei rund 27 Mio. USD Gewinn, erstmals mehr als 1 Mrd. USD Warenvolumen je Quartal. Vorher war die Aktie nach dem Wechsel von der australischen Boerse an die Nasdaq (2023) fast unbeachtet. Where this company stands today is covered in our full analysis of Sezzle Inc..

Period 2023-10 to 2025-06. Market value at the starting point $51 million, still listed. Source: Sezzle-Quartalszahlen Q4/2024 (Earnings Call, Februar 2025, Investing.com) und Q3/2025 (Simply Wall St, 2025); Sezzle-Pressemitteilung vom 10.03.2025 zum 6:1-Aktiensplit (GlobeNewswire)

AXT Inc — 73.7-fold in 13 months

AXT stellt Indiumphosphid-Substrate her, das Grundmaterial fuer die optischen Sende- und Empfangsmodule in KI-Rechenzentren. Die Nachfrage explodierte: AXT verdoppelt die Kapazitaet 2026 und noch einmal 2027, sammelte dafuer 632,5 Mio. USD frisches Kapital ein und meldete Rekord-Auftragsbestaende, waehrend chinesische Exportkontrollen das Angebot zusaetzlich verknappten.

Period 2025-04 to 2026-05. Market value at the starting point $64 million, still listed. Source: Yahoo Finance/Zacks, 04.05.2026 (AXT verdoppelt Indiumphosphid-Kapazitaet fuer KI-Rechenzentren; Q1/2026-Umsatz 26,9 Mio. USD nach 19,4 Mio. USD, Kapitalerhoehung 632,5 Mio. USD); Yahoo Finance/Zacks 2026 zum Kursplus von 345,7 % im laufenden Jahr

Dyax Corp — 30.5-fold in 52 months

Der irische Pharmakonzern Shire kündigte am 02.11.2015 die Übernahme von Dyax für 37,30 $ je Aktie in bar an (rund 5,9 Mrd. $, plus 4 $ je Aktie bei späterer Zulassung des Hauptwirkstoffs); Vollzug war der 22.01.2016. Treiber war das Mittel DX-2930 (später Takhzyro) gegen das erbliche Angioödem, das in der Phase-1b-Studie über 90 % weniger Attacken zeigte.

Period 2011-09 to 2016-01. Market value at the starting point $124 million, no longer listed. Source: Shire-Pressemitteilungen vom 02.11.2015 (Übernahmeangebot) und 22.01.2016 (Vollzug); Dyax-Geschäftsbericht (10-K) 2011 bei der SEC (Quartalskursspannen)

Viking Therapeutics Inc — 36.9-fold in 22 months

Viking Therapeutics veröffentlichte am 27.02.2024 die Ergebnisse der Phase-2-Studie VENTURE zum Abnehmmittel VK2735 (Doppelwirkstoff auf GLP-1/GIP-Basis): bis zu 14,7 % Gewichtsverlust in 13 Wochen. Die Aktie sprang an einem Handelstag um 121 %, weil die Firma damit als ernsthafter Herausforderer von Novo Nordisk und Eli Lilly im Abnehmmarkt galt.

Period 2022-05 to 2024-03. Market value at the starting point $172 million, still listed. Source: Viking-Therapeutics-Pressemitteilung vom 27.02.2024 (Phase-2-VENTURE-Topline); CNBC, 27.02.2024 („stock jumps 120 % after positive weight loss drug trial results")

Hycroft Mining Holding Corporation — 26.8-fold in 24 months

Silber und Gold explodierten (Silber 2025 rund +130 % auf über 69 USD je Unze, Gold +65 % und Anfang 2026 Rekorde über 5.500 USD je Unze), was die riesigen, bis dahin als unwirtschaftlich geltenden Erzvorräte in Nevada auf einen Schlag interessant machte. Dazu kamen im Dezember 2025 die höchsten je gemessenen Silbergehalte aus dem Vortex-System (Aktie an einem Tag rund +50 %), im Januar/Februar 2026 eine um 55 % höhere Gold- und um 56 % höhere Silberressource sowie ein schuldenfreier Abschluss nach Tilgung von 125,5 Mio. USD im Oktober 2025.

Period 2024-02 to 2026-02. Market value at the starting point $380 million, still listed. Source: Hycroft-Pressemitteilungen „Hycroft Delivers 55% Growth in Mineral Resources" (Technical Report mit Stichtag 21.01.2026) und 10-K-Meldung März 2026; Motley Fool 22.12.2025 zu den Vortex-Bohrergebnissen; CNBC/Kitco Januar 2026 zum Goldpreis

All 126 ten-baggers at a glance

Sorted by advance. The factor refers to split- and dividend-adjusted month-end prices. "Retained" gives today's price relative to the peak of the window; a dash means the stock was never traded again afterwards.

How this study was calculated

Universe. Every U.S. common stock listed on a U.S. venue between January 2011 and July 2026: 18,174 currently traded and 32,371 since vanished, 50,545 in total. Funds, warrants, rights and preferred shares are excluded. Foreign companies with a U.S. listing are included, because an investor with U.S. access could buy them.

Hit definition. A stock qualifies as a ten-bagger if its split- and dividend-adjusted price rose at least elevenfold within a window of 60 calendar months or less — measured month-end to month-end so that single outlier days cannot distort the result. Each company counts once, with its strongest window rather than several overlapping ones.

Tradability. At the starting point the stock had to be listed on Nasdaq, NYSE or NYSE American, priced above one dollar, worth more than $50 million and turning over a median of more than $100,000 a day. Market value is derived from the price at the time and the share count reported in the nearest SEC filing — not from present-day figures.

Excluded period. Price windows touching the market phase from February 2020 to November 2021 are not included. The pandemic crash, zero-rate liquidity and the meme-stock wave produced advances there that neither the period before nor after explains. Any window covering the phase even partially was excluded, not just those falling entirely inside it. The observed period therefore spans 165 months — 13 years and 9 months — in two segments.

Data verification. Price series from special situations are error-prone: reverse splits, post-bankruptcy relistings and recycled tickers produce arithmetic advances that never happened. Every hit was therefore checked against the reported split history; titles with impossible closing prices were removed, as were companies that had filed nothing with the regulator for more than six months at the end of their window. Each remaining case was researched individually; eleven whose factor could not be confirmed against independent sources were taken off the list.

Control group. From the same universe we drew a stratified random sample of titles clearing the same hurdles but never reaching an elevenfold rise. The draw is reproducible via a fixed seed. Fundamentals from annual reports are available for 444 of these and for 111 of the hits; the figures are medians, not means.

Limitations. For 15 of the 126 hits no fundamentals could be obtained for the starting point; they are missing from the metric comparison, not from the hit list. For some cases the exchange at the starting point is evidenced by the regulator's current registration data rather than the annual report of the time. And the study covers U.S. venues only — other markets are not included.

Sources. Price data from a commercial fundamentals feed, financial figures and company announcements from original SEC filings (10-K, 10-Q, 8-K), triggers per case from named individual sources recorded in the data table. Data as of July 25, 2026.

What does not follow from this study

That the later ten-baggers were small and loss-making at the starting point does not mean small loss-making companies become ten-baggers at above-average rates. The opposite holds: out of tens of thousands of such companies, 126 made it. The study describes a property of the winners, not a probability for buyers.

This article is a historical study and not investment advice. It contains no buy or sell recommendation and no forecast. Anyone making investment decisions should assess their own situation and risks — with professional advice where appropriate.