Dynex Capital Inc (DX)
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The scanner reports triple-digit revenue growth, but Dynex Capital is not a company with revenue — it is a leveraged bond fund in a stock costume. The "growth" is merely the interest booking of a balance sheet tripled on repo credit from $8 billion to $24 billion — and the record quarter still ended in a loss. The tempting 15.7 percent dividend is not earned. We read the annual report (10-K) and the quarterly report (10-Q). Not investment advice — just the package insert that belongs on this dividend.
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Basics
Performance
Valuation
Profitability
Balance Sheet & Safety
Growth
Dividend
Quality & Screener
AI Rating
Uses AIDynex Capital ist ein Mortgage-REIT ohne jede KI-Umsatzquelle; KI taucht ausschließlich im Risikokapitel der beiden 10-K auf. Das jüngste 10-K (Geschäftsjahr 2025) belegt dort aber einen beginnenden operativen Einsatz: Dynex spricht von der „sich weiterentwickelnden Nutzung“ von KI und Machine Learning, von zunehmender Abhängigkeit von der Technologie, nennt konkrete Einsatzfelder (Datenanalyse, Programmierung, Dokumententwürfe, Zusammenfassen von Research) und verweist auf eigene Richtlinien für den verantwortungsvollen KI-Umgang — im Vorjahres-10-K war davon nur prospektiv („in the future, we may utilize“) die Rede. Die vier geprüften 10-Q enthalten keinerlei KI-Bezug; ein konkretes KI-Risiko für das Geschäftsmodell selbst wird nicht benannt.
View the full file — quotes, sources, reviewed filings
„We may be subject to risks associated with our use of data and technology systems, including our evolving use of AI and machine learning technology."
Wir können Risiken im Zusammenhang mit unserer Nutzung von Daten- und Technologiesystemen unterliegen, einschließlich unserer sich weiterentwickelnden Nutzung von KI- und Machine-Learning-Technologie.
„Further, with technological advances in AI and machine learning technology rapidly accelerating, the risks associated with our use of AI may increase as well due to both increasing reliance on this technology and emerging risks as the technology develops."
Da sich die technologischen Fortschritte bei KI- und Machine-Learning-Technologie rasant beschleunigen, können zudem die mit unserer KI-Nutzung verbundenen Risiken steigen — sowohl durch die zunehmende Abhängigkeit von dieser Technologie als auch durch neue Risiken, die mit ihrer Weiterentwicklung entstehen.
„We may utilize machine learning or AI to create efficiencies or opportunities in our processes (such as data analytics, coding, initial drafts of documents, and summarization of research or longer documents) and such use by us, or by third parties providing information or advice to us, may result in us relying on or receiving incorrect, misleading, or incomplete information, which could materially adversely impact our business and financial results."
Wir können Machine Learning oder KI einsetzen, um Effizienzgewinne oder Chancen in unseren Prozessen zu schaffen (etwa Datenanalyse, Programmierung, erste Dokumententwürfe und das Zusammenfassen von Research oder längeren Dokumenten); eine solche Nutzung durch uns oder durch Dritte, die uns Informationen oder Rat liefern, kann dazu führen, dass wir uns auf falsche, irreführende oder unvollständige Informationen verlassen oder solche erhalten, was unser Geschäft und unsere Finanzergebnisse erheblich beeinträchtigen könnte.
„While our policies require responsible use of AI and machine learning technology, we may be unsuccessful in identifying or resolving potential issues before they arise."
Zwar verlangen unsere Richtlinien einen verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit KI- und Machine-Learning-Technologie, doch gelingt es uns möglicherweise nicht, potenzielle Probleme zu erkennen oder zu lösen, bevor sie auftreten.
Filings Reviewed: 10-Q 2026-04-27 · 10-Q 2025-10-27 · 10-Q 2025-07-28 · 10-Q 2025-04-30 · 10-K 2026-02-25 · 10-K 2025-02-28
Rated on July 9, 2026 · How the Rating Is Built
Quarterly Figures
| Quarter | EPS (Earnings Per Share) | EPS YoY (%) | Sales ($M) | Sales YoY (%) | Net Margin (%) | OCF ($M) | FCF ($M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024: Q4 | 0.63 | 47.40 | 89 | 24.30 | 57.70 | 15 | 15 |
| 2025: Q1 | -0.03 | -105.10 | 95 | 32.90 | -3.20 | 6 | 6 |
| 2025: Q2 | -0.12 | – | 112 | 49.90 | -12.20 | 32 | 32 |
| 2025: Q3 | 1.10 | 170.60 | 150 | 79.30 | 100.50 | 68 | 68 |
| 2025: Q4 | 1.18 | 88.60 | 177 | 100.00 | 104.70 | 14 | 14 |
| 2026: Q1 | -0.40 | – | 257 | 170.80 | -31.20 | 70 | 70 |
- EPS (Earnings Per Share):
- Quarterly profit divided by the total share count — how much of the profit works out to a single share.
- YoY (Year over Year):
- Change versus the same quarter a year ago — this is how you compare without seasonal distortion (e.g. the holiday shopping season).
- Sales:
- All revenue for the quarter, before any costs are deducted — the top line of the income statement.
- Net Margin:
- What percentage of sales is left over as profit in the end. Negative means the company is posting a loss.
- OCF (Operating Cash Flow):
- The cash that actually flows into the till from the core business during the quarter — harder to dress up than book profit.
- FCF (Free Cash Flow):
- Operating cash flow minus capital expenditures — the money that's genuinely free to use, say for paying down debt, buybacks, or dividends.
Assessment: Opportunities & Risks
Predominantly agency MBS guaranteed by the government-sponsored U.S. institutions Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — practically no credit default risk, high liquidity. Internally managed, so no expensive external management fees.
The +170.8 percent of "revenue" is a balance-sheet artifact: total assets were tripled in five quarters from $8.2 billion to $24.3 billion. The record quarter Q1 2026 still showed a net loss of $80.4 million; the 2025 net interest spread was just 0.47 percent. The rank-3 spot in the EBIT-margin ranking (US selection, as of July 18, 2026) is the same distortion — interest expense does not reduce EBIT.
The 15.7 percent dividend is not earned: in 2025, $2.00 was paid but only $0.90 earned (EAD); in 2024 the earned result was negative at minus $0.35. Part of it is a return of the shareholders' own capital for tax purposes; no minimum dividend level has been established.
Book value per share fell from $19.08 (end of 2020) to $12.60 (03/31/2026) — minus 34 percent. The share count rose from 53.6 million to 207.2 million since the end of 2022; the dividend is increasingly paid out of freshly collected capital to a larger share base.
Leverage of 8.6 times equity on repo loans callable overnight ($21.0 billion), which the lenders extend at their own discretion. Falling bond prices trigger margin calls; the first quarter of 2026 produced a negative total economic return of $0.34 per share.
The interest environment turned in favor of mortgage REITs in 2025 (the earned spread came back out of negative territory, rate cuts); per management, a directive covering $200 billion of bond purchases provides an additional tailwind. That can turn again with the yield curve.
Dynex Capital is not a growth stock but a leveraged interest-rate bet with a high yet unearned payout. The "triple-digit revenue growth" is an accounting artifact of a balance sheet tripled on repo credit; the 15.7 percent dividend is earned to less than half and partly paid out of the investors' own capital, while book value erodes over the long run. On the other side stand government-guaranteed securities, internal management and an interest environment that was favorable in 2025. Not investment advice.
- For a mortgage REIT, price-to-sales and price-to-earnings ratios are misleading; the relevant valuation figure is the price-to-book ratio (around 1.05 as of March 31, 2026). The EBIT margin (rank 3 in the US EBIT-margin ranking as of July 18, 2026) is likewise distorted, because interest expense — the largest real cost — does not reduce EBIT.
- The record 2025 profit ($319 million) consists mostly of non-cash fair-value gains on the bonds, not of recurring earnings power.
- Distress metrics such as the Altman Z-Score (−1.94) are of limited methodological validity for financial companies, but they do reflect the heavily leveraged balance-sheet structure.
About the Company
Dynex Capital, Inc., ein Hypotheken-Immobilien-Investmenttrust, investiert in Wohn- und Gewerbe-Hypothekenpfandbriefe (MBS) in den USA.
| CEO Insider Trades (12 Mo.) | buying own stock |
|---|---|
| Employees | 28 |
| Headquarters | Glen Allen, VA |
| Website | dynexcapital.com |
| IPO Date | 30. Jun 1989 |
| Next Earnings | 20. Jul 2026 |
Management
| Name | Title | Birth Year |
|---|---|---|
| Byron L. Boston | Co-CEO & Chairman of the Board | 1959 |
| Smriti Laxman Popenoe C.F.A. | Co-CEO, President & Director | 1969 |
| Michael Sartori | Chief Financial Officer | 1981 |
| Meakin Bennett | Chief Operating Officer | – |
| Terrence J. Connelly Jr. | Chief Investment Officer | – |
| Jeffrey L. Childress | Chief Accounting Officer | – |
| Alison G. Griffin | Vice President of Investor Relations | – |
| Michael Angelo | Chief Legal Counsel & Corporate Secretary | – |
| Wayne E. Brockwell | Senior VP & Portfolio Manager | – |
| Robert M. Nilson Jr. | Chief Risk Officer | – |
Executives per the latest required filings; titles kept in their original language. Source: fundamental data.
Chart
Interactive price chart (TradingView).
Data as of: July 20, 2026 · Source: fundamental data & SEC filings (annual and quarterly reports, 10-K/10-Q)
Note: pure fact-based analysis, not investment advice and not a solicitation to buy or sell. All figures without guarantee.